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Abstract 
Although many people are living longer and healthier than before and life 
expectancies have even more than doubled in the last 150 years, cultures of aging 
have not kept up with these developments. On the contrary: in most Western 
countries people are driven from the labor market at a younger age than was still 
the case in the 1960s and they are labeled as ‘aged ‘as soon as they have become 
50 years old. Partly as a response to this early exclusion from normal adulthood, 
cultures of aging have developed which paradoxically define aging well as 
“staying young”. This article argues that contemporary developments in longevity 
ask for inspiring cultures of aging which do not deny its vulnerabilities nor 
belittle its potentials. As unique lives are deepened in aging, they may lead to 
inspiring cultures of aging which go beyond the dominant perspectives that 
emphasize either staying young or hopeless decline. 
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Resumen 
Aunque muchas personas están viviendo más tiempo y con más salud que antes, y 
las expectativas de vida se han más que duplicado en los últimos 150 años, los 
comportamientos sociales ante el envejecimiento no se corresponden con estos 
desarrollos. Por el contrario, en la mayoría de países occidentales, las personas 
son excluidas del mercado laboral a una edad más temprana incluso que en la 
década de 1960, y son etiquetadas como 'mayores' tan pronto como cumplen 50 
años de edad. En parte como respuesta a esta exclusión temprana de la edad 
adulta, los estudios sobre el envejecimiento han propuesto, paradójicamente, 
definiciones de envejecer bien como "mantenerse joven". Este artículo sostiene 
que la evolución contemporánea de la longevidad reclama nuevas propuestas 
sobre el envejecimiento que no nieguen sus vulnerabilidades ni menosprecien sus 
potencialidades. Puesto que con la edad se ahonda en la singularidad de la vida, 
esto debería inspirar nuevas aproximaciones al envejecimiento que vayan más 
allá de las perspectivas habituales, que se decantan, o bien por una cultura del 
mantenerse jóvenes, o por un declive sin esperanza. 
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n terms of statistical measurements more humans live longer than 
ever before: life expectancy at birth has practically doubled in most 
developed countries over the last 150 years. Yet something appears 
to be missing. There have been repeated calls, especially by the World 
Health Organization since World Health Day 1982, to add “life” to years 
after years have been added to life. The culture, however, that is 
instrumental in making lives longer, through such things as improved 
hygiene and medical care, is not up to addressing all questions that arise 
in trying to facilitate and inspire more meaningful lives while aging. This 
can be seen in many models of “successful aging” which tend to 
emphasize the absence of illnesses (Rowe & Kahn, 1987; Baltes & 
Baltes, 1990). 
It must be stated, however, that aging is intrinsically connected to 
increased risks of suffering from illnesses or disabilities, as biological 
senescing implies a gradual reduction of the functional capacities of the 
different parts and organs of the human body. This means that our 
concepts of “aging well” must include good ways to deal with chronic 
diseases and handicaps that may accompany aging. But these ways must 
form part of an inspiring culture of aging, in which aging people can 
continue to play a role. This is all the more important as aging has 
changed since the days when most present pension systems that regulate 
societal participation were developed. In the past, the age of retirement 
was extremely high compared to life expectancies as agricultural and 
industrial work were so hard that whoever lived long enough to benefit 
from retirement was usually physically exhausted and in ill shape. 
Nowadays, many people may live for a relatively long time after having 
been awarded the status of being “aged.” Yet this is occurring at ages that 
have, astonishingly, been lowered since the eighties of the last century, 
while life expectancies have risen. Most organizations that guard the 
interests of older persons use the age of fifty years as a criterion for 
membership. It might be said that social and cultural senescing has 
accelerated, while it has slowed down in terms of waning functional 
capacities. This tendency to expel aging persons from the central 
domains of society at relatively early ages has resulted in a remarkable 
construction of the life course which puts an enormous pressure on a 
relatively short period of “normal” adulthood, in which careers must be 
realized, children must be raised and pensions must be built up within 25 
I 
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to 30 years. At the same time, people who have been declared “aged” at a 
chronological age of 50 or 55 years may still live several decades, 
perhaps longer than their lives as “normal” adults. Even when these 
people are chronically ill, they cannot be expected to constantly focus on 
their coming death. In the absence of an inspiring culture of aging well, 
the aged tend to focus on staying young, encouraged and cheated by a 
commercial culture of anti-aging. 
It becomes clear that the term “aging” must be used with care: we 
have to distinguish getting a higher age from biological senescing but 
also from the socio-cultural senescing of functional capacities, while 
“aging” may serve as a term which refers to the ways in which people 
live their lives after they have been labeled as ‘aged’ by their societies. 
More static terms such as “old age” or “senescence” are losing their 
meaning in face of the highly differentiated and long term processes that 
are relevant here. In speaking about “aging,” it is important to proceed 
carefully, because the term “aging” refers to a general process which can 
only be observed in specific people. In the public arena we can, however, 
find many specifically colored, but presumably general images of aging 
which have been created by agents who have huge interests in advocating 
these images. We can find interesting examples of this in the anti-aging 
industry, which generally tries to promote an image of aging that is the 
result of good or poor maintenance or investment. Other institutions may 
tend to identify aging with a burden of care that ought to be managed 
according to their specific organizational models and interests. Such 
generalizing positive or negative images do not fit well with the actual 
information available on the elderly in Western societies, which 
demonstrates an impressive variety in the social trajectories and 
individual experiences of aging that should be taken more seriously 
(Maddox & Powell Lawton, 1988; Crystal & Waehrer, 1996; Kunzmann, 
2008; Yang & Lee, 2010). 
However, such variety does not mean that anything is possible. 
Although there is certainly no reason to paint a negative picture of aging, 
it is nevertheless an anthropological reality that vulnerability accumulates 
in higher ages. Aging is a process in which the vulnerability that is an 
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The Need for an Inspiring Culture of Aging 
 
We can speak of a cultural lag: cultural developments lag behind the 
reality of a growing importance of aging processes. This results in a 
strong need for a culture of aging in which participation and recognition 
of aging persons are encouraged and, possibly, newly emerging 
meanings of aging can be discovered and reflected upon. To discover 
such meanings, we can focus on experiences which are exclusive to 
people referred to as “aged.” Such an approach may have its own value, 
but has the effect of separating the “aged” from the “non-aged” and, 
more fundamentally, of separating aging from normal life. 
I would like to explore how the interpretation of human life may be 
enriched by experiences that are more likely to be made in aging than 
while being young, although they are not exclusive to the aged. Processes 
of aging and its place in society have changed to such a degree that we 
now have the opportunity to discover aspects that could not be 
experienced as easily before. Aging is not so much a phase of life but 
especially a process enabling a perspective freed from many practical 
preoccupations, making it possible to gain a more detached vision of the 
crucial qualities of human life. Such a detached but still engaged vision, 
which may touch on traditional motives of wisdom demands involvement 
and dedication. 
There is still a lot to learn from the great philosophers of the past, but 
they have written far more about death than about aging. This is 
understandable, as they lived in times when persons of all ages lived far 
more under the threat of a sudden death than is the case nowadays. As we 
can learn from historical demography, well into the 20
th
 century the risk 
of dying was much higher for any age (Imhoff, 1984). This historical 
background explains why the fundamental idea of human finitude tended 
to be identified with mortality (Baars, 2012). Throughout history, poets, 
theologians, and philosophers have been overwhelmed by the experience 
that all that we are and do, is futile because sooner or later, this will all be 
gone. Here, the futility and vanity of all us humans who like to think they 
are so important stare us in the face. Life seems just a short period during 
which we are under the illusion that our activities and personal views 
really matter, but they rest on nothing more than an all-too-short breath 
of life. The message for those who are already “aged” is that their lives 
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are even shorter: they are well advised to prepare for their deaths. Of 
course, mortality has lost none of its inevitable seriousness, but there are 
good reasons to give finitude a broader interpretation which addresses 
more strongly the qualities of life. I propose that aging nowadays 
presents us with the possibility of discovering other qualities that may 
inform and enrich our understanding of living in time (Baars, 2010). 
At this point it is of interest to reread some ancient narratives about 
the differences between finite and infinite life. In Homer’s Odyssey 
(Homer, 1991) we find the story of the hero Odysseus who finds himself 
on the island of the wonderful goddess Calypso under whose spell he has 
been for several years. The Olympic gods, however, force Calypso to set 
him free. Thus, he is faced with a far-reaching choice: either he can 
continue to share his life with the beautiful and ageless Calypso and will 
not die, or he will have to leave her island and may have to fight for his 
life in order to return to his home on the island of Ithaca. Odysseus 
answers Calypso that he longs to return to his wife and prefers a mortal 
life, although he does not look forward to all the dangers he may have to 
face. But, he emphasizes, he has “a heart that is inured to suffering” 
(Homer, 1991, p. 76) which has helped him in the past, so he will endure 
what is to come. This episode is very interesting when compared with the 
many stories about paradises where eternal life was lost in punishment of 
sinful behavior. Important in this classical quotation is not the heroic 
pose of the lonely warrior who conquers all, but the autonomous decision 
–not a condemnation– to choose a mortal life full of uncertainty yet also 
full of possible precious encounters with other persons. This preciousness 
of life is intrinsically related to its finitude. Odysseus decides in favor of 
a finite and vulnerable life: a profound choice with far-reaching 
implications. If everything could always be postponed, nothing would 
really matter. Only in a finite life can something be really at stake and 
can life gain its full depth in this very moment. 
The early Homeric emphasis on the value of mortal life was 
developed centuries later by Roman Stoics such as Seneca (4 BC-65) and 
Marcus Aurelius (121-180). The Stoics could be quite drastic in their 
condemnation of those who hesitate to live because of their fear of death 
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See how they desire to live long! Worn-out old men pray like 
street-beggars for the addition of a few years; they pretend to be 
younger than they are; they flatter themselves with lies and get as 
much pleasure from self-deception as if they were deceiving fate as 
well as themselves. When finally some weakness has reminded 
them of their mortality, how fearfully they meet death, as though 
they are not quitting life but been dragged away from it! They shout 
repeatedly that they have been fools, as they have not really 
lived…That is when they reflect on how pointlessly they have 
toiled to gain what they did not enjoy, how all their effort has been 
utterly wasted (Seneca, 2007, 150f.) 
 
For these Stoic philosophers philosophy was also an art of living and 
they warned their audiences not to spoil life out of fear of death. Early 
modern thinkers such as Petrarch (1304-1374) and Montaigne (1533-
1592) have repeated the message that fear of death can be avoided 
because death is unavoidable (Baars & Dohmen, forthcoming). For them, 
the meaning of fear was that it might help to avoid the danger the fear 
focuses on; but in the case of death, this does not make sense. Seneca and 
Montaigne are used to looking death in the face and have little 
compassion with those who complain that they have to die; they see this 
behavior as a waste of time and believe that those who waste the time of 
their lives do not really deserve to live any longer. If they were granted a 
longer life, they would still not know how to enjoy it. And anyway, 
because we will be dead an eternity, living a little longer or shorter would 
not make a difference. Seneca stresses that he does not experience his life 
as short, because he does not allow time to be taken from him as do those 
occupati who let themselves be carried away by the course of events and 
the many things to do. 
Whereas the beginning of the Stoic art of life is the acceptance of the 
inevitability of death, more Epicurean is the strategy to ignore death, 
because it would not be a part of life. According to Epicurus, we will 
never meet death, because as long as we live, death is absent, and when 
death arrives, we are not there anymore. In his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Wittgenstein (1974) repeats this Epicurean statement: 
“Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death” 
(6.4311). It is clear that thinkers in the Epicurean and Stoic traditions 
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have tended to see death merely as one’s own death, whereas the death of 
others who are dear to us will be fully experienced and remain a painful 
horizon of vulnerable life. 
 
Aging as Finitization: A Deepening of Unique Lives 
 
As a result of the traditional fascination with death and a concomitant 
neglect of aging, finitude has usually been understood as mortality, 
which is not unimportant but must be extended to the different times in 
which we live and age (Baars, 2007). In transforming the awareness that 
our lives are finite into an inspiring perspective for aging, I do not intend 
to diminish the importance of death as the last horizon of this life that we 
live. I will, however, turn this perspective around and feed its intensity 
back into life as a whole. Instead of diminishing the importance of mortal 
life because, after a while we will all be dead; or identifying life with 
youth and “normal” adulthood, while positioning “old age” in the 
shadow of death, I would like to emphasize that every moment can get a 
special depth and every life a quality of uniqueness because life as such 
is finite. Emphasizing the finitude of life can also increase the intensity 
with which we live it; also, or especially, as we are aging. When we 
realize that the times of our lives are limited, we become aware that we 
must live these short lives and face the challenges and opportunities that 
are most essential to us. Another change of perspective compared with 
the main tradition of Western thought about death, from the ancient 
Greeks and Romans to modern philosophers as Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger is that the issues of finitude and death include the constitutive 
importance of other people instead of being just a personal challenge.  
The extension of finitude to the different times in which we live and 
age is the essence of the perspective of finitization: its underlying idea is 
that the inevitability of change can inspire us to appreciate the 
uniqueness of persons and situations as they are emerging, changing and 
disappearing over time (Baars, 2002, 2012). This perspective of 
finitization, of living a finite life in all situations and phases, is also 
meant as an affirmation of life, not only in its glorious moments but also 
when life is difficult. 
There is a deep connection between finitude and individual 
uniqueness. The fact that persons and situations will not remain the same 
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highlights the particular qualities and limitations of individuals at 
particular moments, their relationships with others in specific situations, 
and the uniqueness of this all. Of course, everything is temporary, but 
this is precisely what makes life so important. The easy association 
between aging and finitude in the limited sense of mortality tends to 
occlude the finitude that pervades human life as we live it. Even being 
young does not offer any guarantees: statistics about life expectancy are 
just long-term generalizations. The wish to ignore finitude not only 
during youth but also during “normal” adulthood leads to an abstract 
image of a normalized world that excludes those “abnormal” persons 
who do not fit these images. 
An important limitation of the Odyssey and many later narratives is 
that all attention tends to be focused on the struggle of the young hero 
with a daunting adversary such as a Cyclops, dragon, giant, or magician. 
After victory comes the reward when the hero receives what he fought 
for. Odysseus returns home and is reunited with his wife; the prince puts 
the princess on his white horse “and they live happily ever after.” What 
happened after the fight is apparently not worth mentioning, although 
this is what the fight was all about. Although the activist struggle for life 
entails more sensation, most recounted adventures turn around the 
endangered freedom and dignity of human lives, and there is no reason to 
remain stuck at the sensational level. 
Likewise, aging life may offer more opportunities and unexpected 
exciting challenges than are foreseen in a career-oriented planning of the 
life course. In other words, the adventure of life does not only unfold in 
youth and “normal” adulthood but also in later life. 
In order to explore this a bit further, I propose that human aging can 
be seen as:  
A. a gradual intensification of a vulnerability which is inherent in 
human life. 
B. a process of increasing complexity, richness of reflected 
experience and diversity.  
In their interaction both processes offer a perspective on the meanings 
of human aging. 
The chances of understanding these two dimensions of life in aging 
are much higher than during fully active, busy life. The qualities of finite 
life, which can reveal themselves more easily –although certainly not 
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exclusively– in aging can be an enrichment for life in all its phases. The 
meaning of aging can therefore be seen as a deepening of the 
understanding of life in every phase. 
 
A. The Vulnerability of the Inter-Human Condition 
 
A fundamental uncertainty is part and parcel of the inter-human 
condition and applies to our existence in its entirety. Human life is not 
accidentally, but essentially vulnerable, which is the most direct 
manifestation of its finitude: 
 Human life contains death 
 Human freedom contains the possibility of evil 
 Intense happiness contains an equally intense suffering 
The intensity and the ways in which we participate in life are related 
to an awareness of its vulnerability. Facing our own or someone else’s 
possible and eventually even inevitable death, can lead to a fuller 
experience of the value of a relationship. But there are many less 
dramatic examples of this fundamental uncertainty and vulnerability of 
all that is really precious. We are, for instance, unable to control others 
insofar as they are personally important to us. Paradoxically, this 
constitutes the possible value of an encounter or a conversation. What 
would be the meaning of such an encounter if we were able to tell what 
was going to happen? In that case, an encounter would lose much of its 
possible importance and would become a mere confirmation of what has 
already been agreed upon or was otherwise determined. The acceptance 
of the mutual possibility of getting hurt is an imperative condition for all 
relationships that imply personal involvement in one way or another. At a 
fundamental level, vulnerability also implies that we have no guarantees 
that all we wish for, aim at or count on will actually happen. If we have a 
personal need for our fellow humans, this particularly concerns their 
quality of being spontaneous and potentially unpredictable. Likewise, 
communication has to be attempted again and again, with all the risks of 
not succeeding; forgetting this leads to a way of communicating that can 
regress into slick mono-logical routine. Potential misunderstanding is not 
an external disturbance or disorder, but a reference to the vulnerability of 
communication processes and the precarious, provisional nature of 
rationality and morality. 
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In our attempts to understand the world, each other and ourselves, we 
are continuously confronted with alienation, misunderstanding and lack 
of clarity. However, this has also led to the great philosophical or 
scientific designs of reality, although these have too often claimed to 
offer a foundation that would be beyond all doubt. Even if we no longer 
take such absolutist claims seriously, these designs represent unceasing 
attempts to find meaningful answers to the vulnerability of the inter-
human condition.  
Which is not so easy: neither in attempts to understand our situation, 
nor in relating to suffering. Although in wealthy countries disturbing 
forms of suffering are removed from sight and placed in professional 
institutions, we still know that numerous people are born with major 
deficiencies or chronic health problems. Moreover, we inevitably 
experience not only personal loss and tragedy, but are also faced with 
large-scale disasters or genocide as reported by the media or described in 
historical documents. Such occurrences highlight our finitude as the 
incapacity to make sense of such suffering or to end it. Of course, old age 
can also be a source of intensive, sometimes long lasting suffering, as in 
advanced stages of Alzheimer’s, in which we can find no meaning. There 
is a continuous need for meaningful answers that, however, elude us in 
their promised definitiveness. Finitude is not a philosophical invention; it 
is rather the starting point of philosophy and other forms of exploring the 
world that try to find answers from within the inter-human condition. 
In its various ways, vulnerability has a constitutive meaning because 
it is part of our reality and it drives us to develop humane responses: the 
genuinely humane part of the story of life begins when we face these 
happenings and respond to them. Then, apparently meaningless 
occurrences can become meaningful. The inter-human condition is not 
only characterized by negativity and meaninglessness, but also by the 
affirmative answers that serve as humane responses. The vulnerability of 
life invites human responses of solidarity, as life’s problems can not 
usually be dealt with by presumably independent individuals, neither at 
life’s beginning and ending nor at many moments in between. The 
challenges we face, being confronted with the uncontrollable 
vulnerability of life, are permanent and cannot in any way be expelled 
definitively. They belong to an inter-human condition that shows its 
quality –or the lack of it– in the way it deals with them. These challenges 
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cannot be regarded as external, manageable problems which interfere 
with an uncomplicated daily normality. 
We cannot, however, maintain that all forms of suffering are direct 
consequences of this fundamental vulnerability of life. Many problems 
that face aged people have little to do with their age, and much more with 
their problematic situations or scarce resources. To approach these 
problems adequately, we must avoid three pitfalls. The first pitfall is to 
assume that all problems which occur during aging are the inevitable 
result of an increasing vulnerability which should be accepted; thus 
neglecting the possible structural sources of suffering. From life course 
data we can conclude that there are many structural mechanisms which 
produce unnecessary suffering; problems gerontologists have articulated 
as cumulative disadvantage over the life course or as gross inequalities in 
life chances over the globe (Baars, Dannefer, Phillipson & Walker, 2006; 
Dannefer, 2003). Such structural sources of misery may not only demand 
political responsibility but also a broader social responsibility. The 
second pitfall concerns the idea or pragmatic attitude that suffering only 
deserves serious attention when it can be cured or otherwise fixed 
quickly as in a pit stop model of service, which puts chronic disease and 
long term care in a risky position. This comes close to excluding chronic 
suffering from normality; an exclusion which not only affects frail 
elderly, but also the mentally and physically disabled or the chronically 
ill of all ages. This is certainly not a social development we should 
support, as it undermines the humane quality of society that affects far 
more people than the elderly alone, as vulnerability is inherent to human 
existence. The third pitfall is the assumption that human suffering has 
only external causes which can and should be taken away. There are still 
good reasons to heed the vulnerability of the interhuman condition, for 
the highly cultivated ability of the Western world to cure diseases, create 
safer environments, and postpone dying has created the illusion that 
people suffer or die because the efforts to help them have failed. 
Although this can also be the case, eventually human life runs against its 
inherent limitations. The highly specialized and often effective 
technology tends to obscure this insecure character of the interhuman 
condition and to create the illusion that people are dying because medical 
technology has not yet found the means to cure the diseases they are 
dying from (Hayflick & Moody, 2003). Where suffering cannot be 
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helped, in spite of all efforts, it deserves to be dignified as an integral part 
of vulnerable human life.  
 
Aging as increasing vulnerability 
 
Positioning aging within the context of the vulnerability of the inter-
human condition is not intended to play down the more problematic 
aspects of aging. On the contrary, in the process of aging the 
vulnerability of the inter-human condition can easily increase: love may 
end, loved ones may die, your body can fail you in different ways, and 
friends may leave or disappoint you. It is important, however, not to 
create an abstract opposition between invulnerable normal adulthood and 
the vulnerable elderly. When care is needed it should be given; there is 
no need to regard all aging persons as dependent or a burden to society. 
Such negative generalizations do no justice to the enormous amount of 
informal care which is done by people who are themselves labeled 
“aged.”  
Problems of bodily senescing are an inevitable reality but their 
complicated dynamics do not operate in synchrony with calendar age and 
their effects can be very different as genetic dispositions interact with 
environments (Gilbert & Epel, 2009). If people are well cared for and do 
not overburden themselves; if they adapt their ways of living to their 
capacities and needs and are “lucky” (a term which expresses partly our 
lack of understanding), they may live healthily for a very long time. But 
they can also become terminally ill when they are young. Generalizations 
may be helpful if one needs a statistical basis for planning facilities for 
large numbers of people, but they tend to also dominate everyday life 
situations where they make much less sense: there are no guarantees in 
aging (as in life); neither positive nor negative. The only certainty is 
death, but within the human life span this is not fixed to any age; it 
comes unexpectedly, unless somebody is already terminally ill. 
It is important to avoid diagnosing human aging solely in medical terms. 
The tendency to see aging as a pathological process implies the surrender 
of aging and the aged to a medical regime. Of course, medical care is 
needed when there are health problems –as in all phases of life– but 
aging is not a disease and, in itself, not a medical but a socio-existential 
process. As soon as these processes are only approached in instrumental 
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medical terms this places aging persons outside interpersonal concerns. 
As far as treatment has technical or professional aspects this may be 
justified, but to respond humanely we need a common ground which 
comes from the acknowledgement of a shared vulnerability. Suffering 
reminds us in a most confronting way of our own vulnerability which 
makes it all too easy to hide behind instrumentality. 
 
B. Increasing Complexities in Aging 
 
Unique lives: empirical and ethical 
 
We inevitably begin our lives in specific circumstances: with this body, 
with those parents, in that time in history, in that part of the world. Being 
born in a specific situation, with particular bodily characteristics, with 
both weak and strong points, is something we can only undergo, although 
it will have major consequences. Human beings are born into 
circumstances that support, frustrate, crush, or inspire them and this 
situationality remains a condition of life. Living implies a constant 
confrontation with situations that “present themselves”: a beautiful 
morning, a nice message, an accident, or an interesting encounter. 
Interwoven with this more fluctuant layer of situations are the more 
persistent cultural or structural characteristics that are related to such 
aspects as citizenship, education, income, health care, housing, 
employment, pensions or ageism (Baars, Dohmen, Grenier & Phillipson, 
2013). Although the circumstances of life and the influences of other 
persons are highly influential and formative during the early years, 
research on the life course of aging adults informs us that the effects of 
enduring situations in adulthood and later life should not be 
underestimated. Although life’s situations may become more strongly 
influenced and modified by the adult, they remain to an important degree 
beyond personal control, for instance where more structural aspects of 
society, our bodily wellbeing and that of intimate others are concerned. 
At the same time, however, by being actively present we inevitably 
sustain or transform the situations we find ourselves in.  
In this permanent interweaving of passivity and activity, we are 
confronted with the finitude of life every day: since I am here, I cannot 
be somewhere else; if I stay indoors to do this, I cannot go out and do 
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something else; I have only this body, not another one. Unique sequences 
of situations and actions that lead to characteristic patterns in someone’s 
life belong to the empirical reference of what I have earlier referred to as 
finitization. This uniqueness of life becomes more striking in the longer 
term as taken opportunities may create other opportunities but discard 
many others. At certain typical turns or transitions in the life course one 
has to choose from a range of possibilities, for instance regarding 
educational trajectories, intimate partners, forms of work or ways to live 
in retirement. Such situations have become more frequent in late 
modernity where education is never finished, lifelong employment in the 
same line of work or even lifelong intimate partners have become less 
typical than before and retirement may become an important part of the 
life course. 
Moreover, late modern culture constantly enlarges the possibilities for 
participating even in situations that are far away in geographical terms. 
When I am in Madrid, I can at the same time chat with somebody in Sao 
Paolo, while being on the phone with a friend in New York. However, I 
remain finite and cannot be in Madrid, Sao Paolo and New York at the 
same time, and this still makes a difference. In all these situations it will 
be necessary to choose and decide without being able to realize 
simultaneously all the other possibilities. Even if somebody would decide 
to do nothing with his or her life and to become as passive as possible, 
this attitude would have an enormous influence on the way such a life 
would be lived. Life cannot be evaded or escaped; it can only take place 
in giving it a finite shape. In this sense I propose to re-interpret finitude 
in an active sense, as a life-long process of finitization.  
As a result of this constant finitization, aging implies on an empirical 
level an increasing singularity of experiences resulting from an interplay 
between, on the one hand, the passivity of life, in which I undergo what 
happens to me, and on the other hand, the formative activity of my 
preferences, habits, choices, and decisions. Individual lives assume their 
unique temporal shapes in such dynamic configurations of activity and 
passivity.  
What are the ethical or moral implications of this perspective? First of 
all, it requires a modesty regarding the many broad generalizations about 
“the aged” that conflict with the unique complexity of their lives. Each 
person grew up in specific circumstances and has been enriched, as well 
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as possibly scarred, by his or her experiences. As people get older, this 
complexity increases rather than decreases. This basic characteristic of 
life challenges all generalizations about “the aged” or “the elderly” that 
pin them down to something abstract such as a number of years. 
Counterevidence can often be found nearby: a closer inspection finds 
huge differences within the category of persons who are classified as 
“aged”; according to many organizations that claim to speak for them 
and their interests, this refers to all persons of fifty years and older. Intra-
age differences will hardly become less important when older persons 
will be compared with other members of their birth cohorts. And in 
personal contacts we can experience that the more we become interested 
in a person, the greater the complexity of his or her motives and actions 
appear to be, and the more hesitant we become to put a label on them. 
Generalizations about age categories and their averages ignore the 
diversity among older people. Their voices have become very thin in the 
many large-scale inventories of “the elderly” and their “measured” 
characteristics, where much is said about them and too little by them. 
Moreover, much that is said by them has been pre-structured by the 
research format. Similarly, the development of policies for “the elderly” 
is a precarious task to be carried out with discretion, since changes in 
policy or organizational formats must be incorporated in practical 
orientations that cannot be decided one-sidedly but should be determined 
together with those involved. 
At a more personal ethical level the inevitable finitization during the 
course of life implies that we must find an adequate response to whoever 
and whatever one encounters in specific situations and to know when and 
where to be present and how. We can learn from biographical 
experiences that serious mistakes in these matters may be seriously 
regretted. What can make decisions complicated is that we cannot 
determine independently, from the position of an isolated individual, 
when and where we should be present, because we are also meaningful to 
others. When it is important to myself and others that I should be present 
in person it is morally risky to arrange that somebody else should 
represent me. This is one of the “things” that are meant by the proverbial 
seriousness of life, which should not be interpreted as an imperative that 
everything should be done seriously, but to know when, where and how 
we should be present.  
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Of course it remains possible to be indifferent to the specific qualities 
of persons or situations and to let life pass by. In such a case, indifference 
is the way life is lived –with all its consequences– there is no possibility 
of an objective experiment during which we step out of time. In that 
sense we cannot withdraw from life. The attention for unique lives does 
not have to end in the narrows of narcissism, because the meanings of 
one’s life are usually deeply connected with the lives of evenly unique 
others even when they are painfully missed. Personal uniqueness 
presupposes others: social and cultural contexts that enable, limit and 
challenge the ways in which personal uniqueness may come to 
expression. Aging is not an individualistic project that remains isolated 
from other people; it is always situated in a life world and confronted 
with systemic structures and processes. Even extreme loneliness 
presupposes the importance of other persons who are painfully missed.  
Personal uniqueness not only has a descriptive sense of a “unique 
biography” but also denotes creativity and transcendence of existing 
situations. There is nothing wrong with reminiscence, but it is usually 
given much prominence in relation to aging and personal uniqueness 
becomes documented in an autobiographical retrospection that seeks 
descriptive completeness in telling the story of one’s life. This tends to 
neglect that older persons still live in the present and move into the 
future. Looking back on unique lives is just one aspect of aging.  
Here, uniqueness interacts with hope and transcendence: we remain 
finite, but we don’t know in advance what our possibilities and potentials 
are. For the philosopher Hannah Arendt, the human condition is 
characterized by “natality”: we are not in the world to die but to be born. 
“With each birth something uniquely new comes into the world. . . . 
[E]ach child is a miracle which saves the world” (Arendt, 1958, p. 178). 
All human beings are endowed with the capacity to begin, to start 
something new, and to do the unexpected. In that sense each day is not 
only a unique present but also a new day that breaks out of reproductive 
cycles. Natality is not only something that happens at birth, but it 
qualifies human lives from birth to death, inspiring life with hope, 
creativity, critique, rebirth, and the emergence of new horizons. 
One way to approach aging would be to see it as a process of 
understanding what it is to be human: to have experienced what it is to be 
young, to grow up, and to go through different situations or phases and to 
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try to grasp what the most crucial or vital aspects are. To a certain extent 
it will be inevitable to make the mistake of projecting one’s own 
understanding and experiences on situations of other persons who are 
equally unique. To begin from one’s own prejudices is, as philosophers 
such as Gadamer (2005) have shown, a hermeneutical necessity. 
Becoming gradually aware of the inevitable prejudices is the only way to 
develop more understanding of other situations, because my life, my 
experiences, and my understanding form the necessary horizons from 
which I can try to approach human life in a more general sense. Instead 
of presuming to begin at a universal level, which would be nothing more 
than elevating my lived experience to the only pattern that counts, I 
remain caught in a process of going back and forth between specific 
experiences and interpretations on the one hand and glimpses of a more 
general pattern on the other hand. In this sense, projections and 
ethnocentricity are unavoidable, but should also be reflectively 





The historical change towards an aging society, with more aged people 
and higher life expectancy, calls for a society where aging persons can 
still make their own contributions. The evolutionary perspective in which 
they constitute a useless post-reproductive dead weight, or “disposable 
soma” (Kirkwood, 1999) cannot be a leading perspective for a humane 
society. In this historical state of affairs, the aged might break new 
ground and paradoxically serve the young with their pioneering work, for 
life expectancies are not likely to decline in the future and there is a lot to 
discover while persons are aging. In order to assert their growing 
resources of experience in society, it is desirable that aging persons speak 
up for themselves and shed light on whatever might be discussed. This 
includes the reflection of experiences in aging. There is an urgent need of 
such a reflection as aging well cannot be the same as staying young 
(Baars, 2012). 
In this way the aged could take up their specific position in the 
dynamics of asymmetry and complementarity over the life course where 
children need parents, pupils need teachers but also vice versa. 
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Moreover, children become parents and pupils become teachers and so 
on and so forth, so the asymmetry is reversible. Consequently, adults will 
be confronted with the children they once were and teachers with their 
pasts as pupils. And they constantly need each other so that everyone can 
play his own role. Thus aging persons are confronted with the children, 
the youngsters and vital adults they once used to be and these may 
encounter some aspects of their possible futures in their aging 
counterparts.  
This requires, however, a situation where ages and generations 
present no major obstacles for mutual encounters and communication. In 
a culture that idealizes being young and dynamic this may be not so easy, 
but it becomes really hard when aging persons identify more with the 
young than with those persons who are confronted with a culmination of 
the vulnerabilities of life. Aging persons can make important 
contributions to an inspiring culture of aging, as part of an inspiring 
perspective on human life as a whole, if they take their aging seriously 
and explore its new perspectives and horizons. The idea of aging I would 
like to derive from this, is one of growing reflective sensitivity; also in 
the sense of a growing ability to tell superficiality and glamour from that 
what really matters. This does not mean that “wisdom comes with age” 
as the saying goes. The vulnerability of life implies that this is not the 
case; there may be “no fool like an old fool” and we are certainly never 
too old to learn. Aging can be brought into an inspiring perspective as a 
possibility of a growing awareness of the value and the dignity of 
vulnerable and passing human life, particularly in its seeming perfectly 
ordinary and everyday moments. As a growing sensitive awareness of the 
fragile particularity of all that we cherish and cling to, it may be a 
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